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Abstract
The problem of symmetric private information retrieval (SPIR) from a coded database which is
distributively stored among colluding servers is studied. Specifically, the database comprises K files,
which are stored among N servers using an (N,M)-MDS storage code. A user wants to retrieve one file
from the database by communicating with the N servers, without revealing the identity of the desired
file to any server. Furthermore, the user shall learn nothing about the other K − 1 files in the database.
In the T -colluding SPIR problem (hence called TSPIR), any T out of N servers may collude, that is,
they may communicate their interactions with the user to guess the identity of the requested file. We
show that for linear schemes, the information-theoretic capacity of the MDS-TSPIR problem, defined
as the maximum number of information bits of the desired file retrieved per downloaded bit, equals
1 − M+T−1
N
, if the servers share common randomness (unavailable at the user) with amount at least
M+T−1
N−M−T+1
times the file size. Otherwise, the capacity equals zero. We conjecture that our capacity
holds also for general MDS-TSPIR schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The situation where a user wants to retrieve a file from a database without revealing the
identity of the requested file is known as the problem of private information retrieval (PIR). It
is shown that if the database is stored at a single server, the only possible scheme for the user
is to download the entire database to guarantee information-theoretic privacy [1], [2], which is
inefficient in practice. It is further shown that the communication cost can be reduced in sublinear
scale by replicating the database at multiple non-colluding servers [2]. To further protect the
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privacy of the database, symmetric private information retrieval (SPIR) is introduced [3], such
that the user obtains no more information regarding the database other than the requested file.
In [1]–[3], the database is modeled as a bit string, and the user wishes to retrieve a single bit. In
these works, the communication cost is measured as the sum of the transmission at the querying
phase from user to servers and at the downloading phase from servers to user.
When the file size is significantly large and the target is to minimize the communication cost
of only the downloading phase, the metric of the downloading cost is defined as the number
of bits downloaded per bit of the retrieved file, and the reciprocal of which is named the PIR
capacity. A series of recent works derives information-theoretic limits of various versions of the
PIR problem [4]–[9] etc. The leading work in the area is by Sun and Jafar [4], where the authors
find the capacity of the PIR problem with replicated databases. In subsequent works by Sun and
Jafar [5], [6], the PIR capacity with duplicated databases, duplicated databases with colluding
servers, SPIR with duplicated (non-colluding) databases are derived. In [7], [9], Banawan and
Ulukus find the capacity of the PIR problem with coded databases, and multi-message PIR with
replicated databases. In our previous work [8], we derive the capacity of the SPIR problem with
coded databases.
Considering another cost in storage systems, i.e. storage overhead, a series of works studies
schemes and information limits for various PIR problems with coded databases [7], [8], [10]–
[14]. In [10], PIR is achieved by downloading one extra bit other than the desired file, given
that the number of storage nodes grows with file size, which can be impractical in some storage
systems. In [11], storage overhead can be reduced by increasing the number of storage nodes.
In [12], tradeoff between storage cost and downloading cost is analyzed. Subsequently in [13],
explicit schemes which match the tradeoff in [12] are presented. It is worth noting that in [7],
the capacity of PIR for coded database is settled, which improves the results in [12], [13]. In
our previous work [8], the capacity of SPIR for coded database is derived. Recently in [14], the
authors present a framework for PIR from coded database with colluding servers, and conjectured
the capacity of the problem, which is settled more recently in [15].
In this work, we generalize our previous work [8] on SPIR for MDS-coded database to the
case with T -colluding servers, hence called MDS-TSPIR. We show that the capacity conjectured
in [14] for PIR from coded database with colluding servers (and settled in [15]) is actually the
capacity for the linear SPIR version of the problem. In analogy to previous works on SPIR [6],
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[8], in the non-trivial context where the database comprises at least two files, storage nodes need
to share common randomness which is independent to the database and meanwhile unavailable to
the user. In particular, we derive the capacity of linear SPIR for an (N,M)-MDS coded database
where any T servers may collude. We also derive a lower bound on the amount of common
randomness needed to assure nonzero capacity. We conjecture that our result holds for general
MDS-TSPIR schemes, which would reduce to our previous result in [8] for non-colluding servers
with T = 1, and the result in [6] for replicated non-colluding databases with T = 1 and M = 1.
II. MODEL
A. Notations
Let [m : n] denote the set {m,m+ 1, . . . , n} for m ≤ n. For the sake of brevity, denote the
set of random variables {Xm, Xm+1, . . . , Xn} by X[m:n] . The transpose of matrix A is denoted
by AT.
B. Problem Description
Database: A database comprisesK independent files, denoted byW1, . . . ,WK . Each file consists
of L symbols drawn independently and uniformly from the finite field Fq. Therefore, for any
k ∈ [1 : K],
H(Wk) = L log q ; H(W1, . . . ,WK) = KL log q.
Storage: The database is stored in a distributed storage system consisting of N servers (nodes)
by an (N,M)-MDS storage code. The data stored at node-n is denoted by Dn. Note that for
any M nodes {n1, . . . , nM} ⊂ [1 : N ], the data {Dn1, . . . , DnM} are linearly and stochastically
independent. Furthermore, they can exactly recover the whole database, i.e.,
H(Dn1, . . . , DnM ) = H(W1, . . . ,WK) = KL log q,
H(W1, . . . ,WK |Dn1, . . . , DnM ) = 0.
User queries: A user wants to retrieve a file Wκ from the database, where the desired file index
κ is drawn from [1 : K]. The MDS storage code is known to the user. In addition to this, the user
has no knowledge of the stored data. Let U denote a random variable privately generated by the
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user, which represents the randomness of the query scheme followed by the user. The random
variable U is independent of the database and the desired file index. Based on the realization
of the desired file index k and the realization of U , the user generates and sends queries to
all nodes, where the query received by node-n is denoted by Q
[k]
n . Let Q =
[
Q
[k]
n
]
n∈[1:N ],k∈[1:K]
denote the complete query scheme, namely, the collection of all queries under all cases of desired
file index. We have that H(Q|U) = 0.
Node common randomness: Let random variable S denote the common randomness shared
by all nodes, the realization of which is known to all nodes but unavailable to the user. The
common randomness is utilized to protect database-privacy (2) below. For any node n ∈ [1 : N ],
a random variable Sn is generated from S, which is used in the answer scheme followed by
node n. Hence, H(S1, . . . , Sn|S) = 0.
Node answers: Based on the received query Q
[k]
n , the stored data Dn, and the random variable Sn
generated from the common randomness, each node sends an answer A
[k]
n to the user. Specifically
for the linear schemes discussed in this work, the answers are generated by taking the inner
product of the query and stored data, then plus the random variable Sn used by the node, i.e.
A
[k]
n = 〈Q
[k]
n , Dn〉+ Sn.
T -private SPIR: Based on the received answers A
[k]
[1:N ] and the query scheme Q, the user shall
be able to decode the requested file Wk with zero error. Any set of T nodes may collude to
guess the requested file index, by communicating their interactions with the user. Two privacy
constraints must be satisfied:
• User-privacy: any T colluding nodes shall not be able to obtain any information regarding
the identity of the requested file, i.e.,
I(κ;Q
[κ]
T , A
[κ]
T , DT , S) = 0, ∀T ⊂ [1 : N ], |T | = T. (1)
• Database-privacy: the user shall learn no information regarding other files in the database,
that is, defining Wκ¯ = {W1, . . . ,Wκ−1,Wκ+1, . . . ,WK},
I(Wκ¯;A
[κ]
[1:N ],Q, κ) = 0. (2)
We call a T -private SPIR scheme a good scheme if the user can successfully decode the
desired file, with both user-privacy and database-privacy constraints guaranteed. We use the
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same definition as in [8] for rate and capacity of T -private SPIR schemes.
Definition 1. The rate of a T -private SPIR scheme is the number of information bits of the
requested file retrieved per downloaded answer bit. By symmetry among all files, for any k ∈
[1 : K],
R
(N,M)-MDS
T -SPIR ,
H(Wk)∑N
n=1H(A
[k]
n )
.
The capacity C
(N,M)-MDS
T -SPIR is the supremum of R
(N,M)-MDS
T -SPIR over all T -private SPIR schemes for
(N,M)-MDS storage codes.
Definition 2. The secrecy rate is the amount of common randomness shared by the storage nodes
relative to the file size, by symmetry among all files,
ρ
(N,M)-MDS
T -SPIR ,
H(S)
H(Wk)
.
III. MAIN RESULT
When there is only one file in the database, the two privacy constraints become trivial. When
K ≥ 2, T -private SPIR is non-trivial and our main result is summarized below.
Theorem 1. For symmetric private information retrieval from a database with K ≥ 2 files which
are stored at N nodes with an (N,M)-MDS storage code, where any T nodes may collude, the
capacity of linear schemes is
C
(N,M)-MDS
T -SPIR =


1− M+T−1
N
, if ρ
(N,M)-MDS
T -SPIR ≥
M+T−1
N−M−T+1
0, otherwise
.
Remark:
1) The capacity derived holds for linear schemes. For general schemes, the rate achieved by
the linear scheme in Section V provides an upper bound on the achievable rate. In the proof
of the converse part in Section IV, only Lemma 4 relies on the constraint that the scheme
is linear in the form of A
[k]
n = 〈Q
[k]
n , Dn〉+Sn. We conjecture that the Lemma 4 and hence
the capacity also hold for general schemes.
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2) When T = 1, that is, the storage nodes do not collude, the result of Theorem 1 reduces to
the capacity of MDS-SPIR (for general schemes) derived in our previous work [8].
3) When M = 1, that is, the database is replicated at each server, the result reduces to 1− T
N
.
This is the capacity of general TSPIR, which can be easily proved because the version of
Lemma 4 for M = 1 follows directly from user-privacy for general schemes. It is proved
in [5] that the capacity of TPIR is
1− T
N
1−( T
N
)K
. When K →∞, the capacity of TPIR approaches
the capacity of TSPIR.
4) The problem of MDS-TPIR with no requirement on the database-privacy is directly related to
the SPIR version studied in this work. In the first version of [14], the formula
1−M+T−1
N
1−(M+T−1
N
)K
is conjectured to be the capacity of MDS-TPIR, which is disproven in [15] by several
counterexamples. In Theorem 5 in [15], it is shown that if N < M + T , as K → ∞
the capacity of MDS-TPIR decays and converges to 0. This matches with our result that to
achieve positive rate for MDS-TSPIR, the number of serversN should be at leastM+T . (As
with previous works for various scenarios, the PIR capacity reduces to the SPIR capacity
by letting K → ∞.) However, the capacity of MDS-TPIR and the capacity of general
MDS-TSPIR remain open.
IV. CONVERSE
In this section, we show the converse part of Theorem 1. For any set of nodes, it is direct that
given the queries they receive, their answers are independent of the other queries (to other nodes
and/or with other desired file indexes), i.e. H(A
[k]
N |Q, Q
[k]
N ) = H(A
[k]
N |Q
[k]
N ) for any N ⊂ [1 : N ].
Lemma 2 below states that the same holds conditioned on the requested file Wk.
Lemma 2. For any set of nodes N ⊂ [1 : N ],
H(A
[k]
N |Q,Wk, Q
[k]
N ) = H(A
[k]
N |Wk, Q
[k]
N ).
Proof: We first show that I(A
[k]
N ;Q|Wk, Q
[k]
N ) ≤ 0, as follows
I(A
[k]
N ;Q|Wk, Q
[k]
N ) ≤ I(A
[k]
N ,W[1:K], S;Q|Wk, Q
[k]
N )
(a)
= I(W[1:K], S;Q|Wk, Q
[k]
N )
≤ I(W[1:K], S;Q) = 0,
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where (a) holds because the answers are deterministic functions of the database, common
randomness, and the queries. In the last step, I(W[1:K], S;Q) = 0 holds because the queries
do not depend on the database and common randomness.
On the other hand, it is immediate that I(A
[k]
N ;Q|Wk, Q
[k]
N ) ≥ 0. Therefore, H(A
[k]
N |Wk, Q
[k]
N ) =
H(A
[k]
N |Q,Wk, Q
[k]
N ). 
In Lemma 3 below, we argue that for optimal schemes, the user shall not be able to obtain
any information about the shared common randomness S from the received answers.
Lemma 3. If there is a good scheme where the user can obtain some information about S, i.e.
H(S|A[k][1:N ],Q) < H(S|Q), the scheme can be modified to a good scheme such that the user
downloads less (or the same amount of) information bits, where the user learns no information
about S.
Proof: Without loss of generality, assume that S is uniformly distributed, that is, the nodes
use the lease possible amount of information bits to generate the shared common randomness.
If H(S|A[k][1:N ],Q) < H(S|Q) = H(S), or equivalently I(S;A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q)) > 0, the conditional
distribution of S given the answers is no longer uniformly distributed. Because from the answers,
the user can decode Wk, and the user knows the queries, the uncertainty of the answers only
lies in the symbols of the other files Wk¯ and the common randomness S. The purpose of S is to
randomize the distribution of Wk¯, such that the distribution of Wk¯ is still uniformly distributed
to the user (by database-privacy). If the distribution of S conditioned on the queries and answers
is not uniformly distributed, the scheme can be modified by reducing the amount of information
bits for the common randomness, denote S˜ = g(S) where g(S) is some function of the S used
in the original scheme, such that H(S˜) = H(S|A[k][1:N ],Q) < H(S). For the modified scheme, the
nodes use the same functions as before (in the original scheme A
[k]
n = f(Q
[k]
n , Dn, S)) but with
S˜ to generate the answers, that is A˜
[k]
n = f(Q
[k]
n , Dn, S˜) = f(Q
[k]
n , Dn, g(S)). It can be checked
that the scheme is still a good scheme, with less information bits as shared common randomness
and less (or at most the same) information bits downloaded. The user can still decode Wk
successfully, because A˜
[k]
[1:N ] are generated from less randomness than A
[k]
[1:N ] by replacing S with
S˜, hence H(Wk|A˜
[k]
[1:N ],Q) ≤ H(Wk|A
[k]
[1:N ],Q) = 0. User-privacy is guaranteed by the design of
the query scheme, which is not changed. To see that database-privacy is still preserved, in the
original scheme the user learns some function of S, say l(S). Knowing l(S), the database-privacy
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is guaranteed for the original scheme, hence I(Wk¯;A
k
[1:N ]|l(S),Q) = 0. For any realization of
l(S), the user learns no information of Wk¯ from the answers. Hence, in the modified scheme
where l(S) is set to be some deterministic value, the user still learns no information about Wk¯.
For linear schemes that are the focus of in this work, it is easy to see that if the user can
solve some part of S from the received linear combinations, these solved common randomness
are useless in protecting the database Wk¯, hence are redundant information downloaded. For
general functions defined on the finite field, by Lemma II.4. in [16], the function is equivalent
to some restriction of a polynomial function. With similar arguments, if the user can solve or
obtain any information about S, the answers can be modified by using the same functions but
less information bits of S.

Remark: Allowing the user to be able to learn some information about S does not conflict
the privacy constraints. For example, the user can send null queries, and receive the Sn’s as
answers, hence learn some information about the shared common randomness S. However,
these Sn’s received by the user cannot be used by the nodes to protect the database-privacy in
transmissions where the database content is involved. Furthermore, the information downloaded
by the user about Sn’s are redundant in the sense of optimal downloading cost. In Lemma 3 above,
we formally argue that for optimal schemes, we can require the user to learn no information
about S, because for the converse, we look for the lowest upper bound of the rate.
In Lemma 4 below, we show that for any optimal good linear scheme, the entropy of the
answers conditioned on the queries from any set of M + T − 1 nodes are symmetric among all
file indexes, and the same holds if also conditioned on the requested file.
Lemma 4. For any optimal good linear scheme, and for any set of nodes N ⊂ [1 : N ] with size
|N | = M + T − 1,
H(A
[k]
N |Q
[k]
N ) = H(A
[k′]
N |Q
[k′]
N ), (3)
H(A
[k]
N |Wk, Q
[k]
N ) = H(A
[k′]
N |Wk, Q
[k′]
N ). (4)
Proof: Without loss of generality, assume N = [1 : M+T−1].
Proof of (3): From user-privacy (1), for any set T ⊂ [1 : N ] with size |T | ≤ T , I(κ;A[κ]T , Q
[κ]
T ) =
0, hence H(A
[k]
T , Q
[k]
T ) = H(A
[k′]
T , Q
[k′]
T ). Similarly, I(κ;Q
[κ]
T ) = 0, therefore H(Q
[k]
T ) = H(Q
[k′]
T ).
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From the above, we have that H(A
[k]
T |Q
[k]
T ) = H(A
[k′]
T |Q
[k′]
T ).
For an (N,M)-MDS storage code, the data stored at any set of M nodes are linearly inde-
pendent. Furthermore, because the files in the database are statistically independent, the data
stored at any M nodes are also statistically independent. (See Lemma 1 in [5] and Lemma 2
in [7] for a proof.) For any node n, the answer A
[k]
n is a deterministic function of the query Q
[k]
n ,
the stored data Dn, and the random variable Sn generated from node common randomness. We
first argue that for optimal schemes, given the queries Q
[k]
[1:M ], the answers A
[k]
[1:M ] are statistically
independent. Firstly, H(A
[k]
[1:M ]|Q
[k]
[1:M ]) = H(A
[k]
[2:M ]|Q
[k]
[1:M ]) + H(A
[k]
1 |Q
[k]
[1:M ], A
[k]
[2:M ]). Given the
queries Q
[k]
[2:M ], the answers of nodes [2 : M ] depend only on the data D[2:M ] and the common
randomness S, which are independent with Q
[k]
1 . Hence H(A
[k]
[2:M ]|Q
[k]
[1:M ]) = H(A
[k]
[2:M ]|Q
[k]
[2:M ]).
The answer of each node is a deterministic function of the query received, the data stored
at the node, and the common randomness, hence we write A
[k]
1 as A
[k]
1 (Q
[k]
1 , D1, S). Given
Q
[k]
1 , A
[k]
1 depends on D1 and S, where D1 is independent with (Q
[k]
[2:M ], A
[k]
[2:M ]) by the MDS
storage. If H(A
[k]
1 |Q
[k]
[1:M ], A
[k]
[2:M ]) is strictly smaller than H(A
[k]
1 |Q
[k]
1 ), the only possibility is
that (Q
[k]
[2:M ], A
[k]
[2:M ]) infer some information about S. Hence, the user can download less in-
formation from node 1, because the user shares some information about S with node 1 now.
This contradicts the assumption that the scheme is optimal. Therefore, H(A
[k]
1 |Q
[k]
[1:M ], A
[k]
[2:M ]) =
H(A
[k]
1 |Q
[k]
1 ) and H(A
[k]
[1:M ]|Q
[k]
[1:M ]) = H(A
[k]
[2:M ]|Q
[k]
[2:M ]) + H(A
[k]
1 |Q
[k]
1 ). Repeat the same steps
proves H(Ak[1:M ]|Q
k
[1:M ]) =
∑M
i=1H(A
[k]
i |Q
[k]
i ). This holds for any set with at most M nodes.
Fix a set of T nodes, we can neglect the file index in the queries and answers because of
user-privacy. We argue that for optimal linear schemes, the following equation holds,1
I(A
[k]
[1:M−1];A[M :M+T−1]|Q
[k]
[1:M−1],Q[M :M+T−1])=0. (5)
Recall that for linear schemes, for any n ∈ [1 : M − 1], A[k]n = 〈Q
[k]
n , Dn〉 + Sn, and for any
n ∈ [M : M+T−1], An = 〈Qn, Dn〉+Sn. Considering D[1:M ] as the basis of the storage, which
spans the storage of all nodes, note that for any n ∈ [M + 1,M + T − 1], Dn is linearly and
statistically independent with D[1:M−1], because it contains one independent dimension DM . The
argument below is based on this independence, and also the independence of the symbols in
D[1:M ]. Specifically, for any n ∈ [M+1,M+T−1], Dn =
∑M
i=1 δ
i
nDi for some coefficients δ
i
n’s. If
1We conjecture that this holds also for general MDS-TSPIR schemes.
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equation (5) does not hold, it means that the symbols ofDM can be “cancelled” from A[M :M+T−1].
Hence, the rank of Q[M :M+T−1] is at most T − 1. In other words, there exists aM , . . . , aM+T−1
which are not all zeros, such that
∑M+T−1
n=M anδ
M
n Qn = ~0 (where δ
M
M = 1). Furthermore, note
that D[1:M−1] are all composed of independent symbols, in both the dimension along the storage
nodes [1 : M − 1] and the dimension of the symbols stored at each node. If equation (5)
does not hold, after forming a sum
∑
for some m∈[1:M−1] Q¯mDm + S¯1 from A[M :M+T−1], where
Q¯m =
∑M+T−1
n=M anδ
m
n Qn, the vector Q¯m, if it does not equal a zero vector, should be aligned
with the vector Q
[k]
m . Let the sum formed from A
[k]
1:M−1 equals
∑
for some m∈[1:M−1] Q¯mDm+S¯2, the
user downloaded redundant information, regardless of whether S¯1 = S¯2. Because if S¯1 = S¯2, the
user downloaded at least one redundant answer from some node in [1 : M − 1], which he could
deduce
∑
for some m∈[1:M−1] Q¯mDm + S¯2 from the T answers A[M :M+T−1]. If S¯1 6= S¯2, the user
learns some extra information S¯1− S¯2 regarding the shared common randomness, which are not
useful to the user, hence is also redundant information downloaded. Hence, if (5) does not hold,
the user has downloaded redundant information, which is a contradiction with the assumption
that the scheme is optimal.2
For example, let M = 2 and T = 2, w.l.o.g. we choose the node set {1, 2, 3}, with storage
{D1, D2, D3 = D1+D2}. Given the queries and answers of the three nodes, we can ignore the file
index of node 2 and node 3, which means that Q2, Q3, A2, A3 can be the queries and answers with
any desired file index. If Q
[k]
1 = Q2 = Q3 and S1+S2 = S3, indeed I(A
[k]
1 ;A2, A3|Q
[k]
1 , Q2, Q3) >
0 and it does not violate the two privacy constraints. However, the user could download from
only two of the three node, and still obtains the same amount of information without violating
privacy constraints.
To conclude,
H(A
[k]
[1:M+T−1]|Q
[k]
[1:M+T−1])
= H(A
[k]
[1:M−1]|Q
[k]
[1:M−1], Q[M :M+T−1], A[M :M+T−1])
+H(A[M :M+T−1]|Q
[k]
[1:M−1], Q[M :M+T−1])
= H(A
[k]
[1:M−1]|Q
[k]
[1:M−1]) +H(A[M :M+T−1]|Q[M :M+T−1])
2The argument is written in details for each answer being one linear function of query, stored data and common randomness.
It is direct that if the answer from each node is multiple such linear functions, (5) still holds from the linear and statistical
independence of the data-storage.
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=M−1∑
n=1
H(A[k]n |Q
[k]
n ) +H(A[M+1:M+T−1]|Q[M+1:M+T−1])
=
M−1∑
n=1
H(A[k
′]
n |Q
[k′]
n ) +H(A
[k′]
[M+1:M+T−1]|Q
[k′]
[M+1:M+T−1])
= H(A
[k′]
[1:M+T−1]|Q
[k′]
[1:M+T−1])
Proof of (4): Similarly as in the proof of (3), for any set T with no more than T nodes, by
user-privacy H(A
[k]
T |Wk, Q
[k]
T ) = H(A
[k′]
T |Wk, Q
[k′]
T ). Because any T nodes should not be able to
distinguish the requested file index by conditioning on any part of the database, such as the part
of data they store regarding Wk.
Conditioning on Wk, the data stored at any M nodes are still statistically independent.
Besides, the symbols stored at each node are also statistically independent, because the files
are independent and constructed of independent symbols. For the query vector Qn and stored
data vector Dn, let Qn(k¯) and Dn(k¯) denote the vectors by setting the entries corresponding to
file Wk to zeros. For example, if there are two files in the database and denote D1 = (W11,W21),
correspondingly Q
[k]
1 = (Q
[k]
1 (1), Q
[k]
1 (2)), where Q
[k]
1 (i) is to take the inner product of the part
of W11. Then Q
[k]
1 (1¯) = (~0, Q
[k]
1 (2)). Let An(k¯) denote the answer An conditioned on Wk.
For linear schemes such that A
[k]
n = 〈Q
[k]
n , Dn〉 + Sn, the data D[M+1:M+T−1] are linear
combinations of D[1:M ]. In other words, D[M :M+T−1] all have one dimension aligned with DM
which is independent with D[1:M−1]. Denote the node set [1 : M − 1] by M
′ and the node set
[M : M + T − 1] by T , we argue in the following that the version of equation (5) conditioned
also on Wk holds.
I(A
[k]
M′;AT |Q
[k]
M′,QT ,Wk)=0. (6)
Because Wk is conditioned in (6), the arguments below are similar as in the proof of (3),
but for the vectors obtained by setting the entries corresponding to Wk to zeros, such as Qn(k¯)
and Dn(k¯), and the answers conditioned on Wk, such as An(k¯). If I(A
[k]
M′;AT |Q
[k]
M′ , QT ,Wk) >
0, QT (k¯) have rank smaller than or equal to T − 1, that is, the data aligned with DM(k¯)
can be cancelled among AT . Otherwise, the answers AT are formed of linear combinations of
symbols from DM(k¯), which are independent of D[1:M−1](k¯). Moreover, because D[1:M−1](k¯)
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are composed of independent symbols, I(A
[k]
M′ ;AT |Q
[k]
M′, QT ,Wk) > 0 infers that there exists
some linear combination of AT (k¯) which equals some linear combination of A
[k]
M′(k¯). (Or they
differ by some linear combination of Sn’s, which can be either a constant or some redundant
information to the user.) Let LC(·) denote a linear combination of the input, if (6) does not hold,
the user can calculate LC1(A
[k]
M′) +LC2(Wk) from AT , which are independent of the requested
file index. The user can download the same answers AT from the node set T but actually desire a
different file Wk′ . After downloading A
[k′]
M′ from the node setM
′, the user can calculate the same
linear combination LC1(A
[k′]
M′) from the answers, such that the common randomness SM′ can
be cancelled by taking LC1(A
[k]
M′) + LC2(Wk)− LC1(A
[k′]
M′). (Note that LC1(A
[k]
M′) + LC2(Wk)
are computed from AT .) By database-privacy, the formula LC1(A
[k]
M′) + LC2(Wk)− LC1(A
[k′]
M′)
which the user can compute should only contain information aboutWk′ . Hence, LC2(Wk) cannot
contain information about WkM , the part of Wk stored at node M . Therefore, the dimension
along with DM should be “cancelled” by taking linear combinations of AT , as in the proof
of (3). If LC1(A
[k]
M′) + LC2(Wk)− LC1(A
[k′]
M′) equals zero, the user has downloaded redundant
information from M′, hence the scheme is not optimal. If LC1(A
[k]
M′) +LC2(Wk)−LC1(A
[k′]
M′)
does not equal zero, because D[1:M−1] are independent, there is at least one node n ∈ [1 : M−1]
such that Q
[k]
n −Q
[k′]
n has nonzero entries only corresponding toWk and Wk′ . Replacing this node
with node M , the new set of T nodes T1 may also collude. The nodes can infer the requested
file index by checking whether QT1(k¯) and QT1(k¯
′) are linearly dependent, hence contradicting
user-privacy. Hence, if (6) does not hold, either the user has downloaded redundant information
such that it contradicts optimality, or the scheme contradicts user-privacy.
For example, let M = 2, T = 2 and K = 2 (with W1 = (W11,W12) and W2 = (W21,W22)),
w.l.o.g. we look at the node set {1, 2, 3}, with storage {D1 = [W11,W21], D2 = [W12,W22], D3 =
[W11 + W12,W21 + W22]}. Suppose user wants W1, if I(A
1
1;A2, A3|Q
1
1, Q2, Q3,W1) > 0, the
queries must be of the form Q11 = (Q
1
1(1), Q(2)), Q2 = (Q2(1), Q(2)), Q3 = (Q3(1), Q(2)).
The user can download A2, A3, with W2 be the desired file. In this case, A
2
1 − A2 − A3 can
only contain information regarding W2. Hence, Q3(1) = Q2(1) = Q
2
1(1). To summary, the
queries with W1 desired are Q
1
1 = (Q
1
1(1), Q(2)), Q2 = (Q(1), Q(2)), Q3 = (Q(1), Q(2)), the
queries with W2 desired are Q
2
1 = (Q(1), Q
2
1(2)), Q2 = (Q(1), Q(2)), Q3 = (Q(1), Q(2)). If
Q11(1) = Q(1) or Q
2
1(2) = Q(2), the user can download less information, only from two of the
three nodes. Otherwise, node 1 and node 2 may collude, and it can be checked that there is no
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symmetric query scheme with these Q1 and Q2 such that W1 and W2 are both likely to be the
desired file.
Hence, with similar steps as the proof of (3), we have that H(A
[k]
[1:M+T−1]|Wk, Q
[k]
[1:M+T−1]) =
H(A
[k′]
[1:M+T−1]|Wk, Q
[k′]
[1:M+T−1]). 
Lemma 5. For any set of nodes N ⊂ [1 : N ] with size |N | = M + T − 1,
H(A
[k]
N |Wk, Q
[k]
N ) = H(A
[k′]
N |Q
[k′]
N ).
Proof: By database-privacy (2), I(Wk¯′;A
[k′]
[1:N ],Q) = 0. For any k 6= k
′, because Wk ∈ Wk¯′ , we
have
0 = I(Wk;A
[k′]
N , Q
[k′]
N )
= I(Wk;A
[k′]
N |Q
[k′]
N ) + I(Wk;Q
[k′]
N )
(a)
= I(Wk;A
[k′]
N |Q
[k′]
N )
= H(A
[k′]
N |Q
[k′]
N )−H(A
[k′]
N |Wk, Q
[k′]
N )
(b)
= H(A
[k′]
N |Q
[k′]
N )−H(A
k
N |Wk, Q
[k]
N ),
where equality (a) holds because Wk is independent of the queries, and equality (b) follows
by (4) in Lemma 4. 
Theorem 6. The rate of any linear T -private SPIR scheme for an (N,M)-MDS coded database
is bounded from above by
R
(N,M)-MDS
T -SPIR ≤ 1−
M + T − 1
N
.
Proof: For any file Wk, k ∈ [1 : K], and any set of nodes N ∈ [1 : N ] with size M + T − 1,
H(Wk) = H(Wk|Q)
(a)
= H(Wk|Q)−H(Wk|A
[k]
[1:N ],Q)
= H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q)−H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|Wk,Q)
≤ H(A[k][1:N ]|Q)−H(A
[k]
N |Wk,Q, Q
[k]
N )
(b)
= H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q)−H(A
[k]
N |Wk, Q
[k]
N )
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(c)
= H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q)−H(A
[k′]
N |Q
[k′]
N )
(d)
= H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q)−H(A
[k]
N |Q
[k]
N )
≤ H(A[k][1:N ]|Q)−H(A
[k]
N |Q),
where (a) holds because the user should be able to decodeWk from A
[k]
[1:N ] and the query scheme,
hence H(Wk|A
[k]
[1:N ],Q) = 0. Equalities (b) and (c) follow from Lemma 2 and Lemma 5. Equality
(d) follows from (3) in Lemma 4.
Averaging over all N with size M + T − 1, we have that
H(Wk) ≤ H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q)−
1(
N
M+T−1
) ∑
N∈[1:N ]
|N |=M+T−1
H(A
[k]
N |Q).
By Han’s inequality [17],
1(
N
M+T−1
) ∑
N∈[1:N ]
|N |=M+T−1
H(A
[k]
N |Q) ≥
M + T − 1
N
H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q).
Therefore, R
(N,M)-MDS
T -SPIR =
H(Wk)
∑N
n=1H(A
[k]
n )
≤ H(Wk)
H(A
[k]
[1:N]
|Q)
≤ 1− M+T−1
N
. 
Theorem 7. The secrecy rate of any linear T -private SPIR scheme for an (N,M)-MDS coded
database needs to be at least
ρ
(N,M)-MDS
T -SPIR ≥
M + T − 1
N −M − T + 1
.
Proof: Let N be any set of nodes with size M + T − 1, by database-privacy (2),
0 = I(Wk¯;A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q)
= H(Wk¯|Q)−H(Wk¯|A
[k]
[1:N ],Q)
(a)
= H(Wk¯|Q,Wk)−H(Wk¯|A
[k]
[1:N ],Q,Wk)
= I(Wk¯;A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q,Wk)
≥ I(Wk¯;A
[k]
N |Q,Wk)
(b)
=H(A
[k]
N |Q,Wk)−H(A
[k]
N |Q,W[1:K])+H(A
[k]
N |Q,W[1:K],S)
= H(A
[k]
N |Q,Wk)− I(S;A
[k]
N |Q,W[1:K])
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≥ H(A[k]N |Q,Wk, Q
[k]
N )−H(S)
(c)
= H(A
[k]
N |Q
[k]
N )−H(S)
≥ H(A[k]N |Q)−H(S),
where (a) holds because Wk is independent of other files Wk¯, and from A
[k]
[1:N ] and Q the user
can decode Wk. Equality (b) holds because the answers A
[k]
N are deterministic functions of the
queries Q, the database W[1:K], and the common randomness S. Equalities (c) follows from
Lemmas 2-5.
Averaging over all N , and from the proof of Theorem 6,
H(S) ≥
1(
N
M+T−1
)
∑
N∈[1:N ]
|N |=M+T−1
H(A
[k]
N |Q)
≥
M + T − 1
N
H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q)
≥
M + T − 1
N−M−T+1
H(Wk).
Hence, ρ
(N,M)-MDS
T -SPIR =
H(S)
H(Wk)
≥ M+T−1
N−M−T+1 . 
V. ACHIEVABILITY
In this section, we present a scheme which achieves the capacity with the lowest secrecy rate
in Theorem 1. The storage code is an (N,M)-MDS code. To achieve T -privacy, we generate
queries by using an (N, T )-MDS code. The answers generated in this setting are codewords
from the Schur-product of the storage code and query generating code. From [18], the minimum
dimension of the Schur product of the two MDS codes isM+T−1 (ifM+T−1 ≤ N), achieved
when the two MDS codes are generalized Reed Solomon codes with the same evaluation-point
sequence. Indeed, the scheme in [14] for PIR with coded colluding databases uses generalized
Reed Solomon codes. Our scheme develops that in [14] to guarantee database-privacy.
Database: W.o.l.g, let L=M(N−M−T+1) be the file length, and let matrix W below represent
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all K files,
W =


w
[1]
1,1 w
[1]
1,2 . . . w
[1]
1,M
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . .
.
.
.
w
[1]
N−M−T+1,1 w
[1]
N−M−T+1,2 . . . w
[1]
N−M−T+1,M
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . .
.
.
.
w
[K]
1,1 w
[K]
1,2 . . . w
[K]
1,M
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . .
.
.
.
w
[K]
N−M−T+1,1 w
[K]
N−M−T+1,2 . . . w
[K]
N−M−T+1,M


,
where every N−M−T+1 rows correspond to a file.
Storage: Let Λ = (λ1, . . . , λN) ∈ FNq where λi 6= λj . Let Φ = (φ1, . . . , φN) ∈ F
N
q where φi 6= 0.
The generating matrix of the storage code is
GS =


1 . . . 1
λ1 . . . λN
.
.
.
. . .
.
.
.
λM−11 . . . λ
M−1
N

 · diag(Φ).
The data stored at the N nodes are generated by
[D1, . . . , DN ] = D = W ·GS.
Queries: Let Ψ = (ψ1, . . . , ψN ) ∈ FNq where ψi 6= 0. The generating matrix of queries is
GQ =


1 . . . 1
λ1 . . . λN
.
.
.
. . .
.
.
.
λT−11 . . . λ
T−1
N

 · diag(Ψ).
The user queries M rounds. For each round r, r ∈ [1 : M ], the user generates T indepen-
dent uniformly random vectors U
(r)
1 , . . . , U
(r)
T of length (N −M −T +1)K over Fq. Denote
[U
(r)
1 , . . . , U
(r)
T ] = U
(r), the N random vectors corresponding to each node are generated by
[U˜
(r)
1 , . . . , U˜
(r)
N ] = U˜
(r) = U(r) ·GQ.
W.o.l.g, assume the desired file is W1. The detailed query scheme is presented in two orthog-
onal cases as follows.
• Case 1 (N−M−T+1 ≤M) Let ei denote the unit vector of length (N−M−T+1)K with
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E1 E2 . . . EM EM+1 ∼ E2M E2M+1 ∼ E3M . . . EαM+1 ∼ E(α+1)M E(α+1)M+1 ∼ EN
e1 0 e2 eβ+1 eM+β+1 e(α−1)M+β+1 0
e2 e1 e3 eβ+2 eM+β+2 e(α−1)M+β+2 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
eβ−1 eβ−2 . . . eβ e2β−1 eM+2β−1 . . . e(α−1)M+2β−1 0
eβ eβ−1 0 e2β eM+2β e(α−1)M+2β 0
0 eβ 0 e2β+1 eM+2β+1 e(α−1)M+2β+1 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 e1 eβ+M e2M+β eαM+β 0
TABLE I
MATRIX E WHEN USER WANTS W1 AND N−M−T+1 > M (CASE 2).
a one at the ith entry, and zeros at all other entries. Let matrix
E=


e1 0 . . . e2 0 . . . 0
e2 e1 . . . e3 0 . . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . .
.
.
.
eN−M−T eN−M−T−1 . . . eN−M−T+1 . . .
eN−M−T+1 eN−M−T . . . 0 . . .
0 eN−M−T+1 . . . 0 . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . .
.
.
.
0 0 . . . e1 0 . . . 0


be an M(N−M−T +1)K × N matrix, where the unit vectors are designed in a shifted
way among the first M nodes, to retrieve symbols of W1. The queries are generated by
randomizing E from adding random matrices U˜(r), i.e.,
Q
[1]
[1:N ] = [U˜
(1), . . . , U˜(M)]T + E. (7)
• Case 2 (N−M−T+1 > M) In this case, let β = N−M−T+1 (modM), and N−M−T+1 =
αM + β. The matrix E is as shown in Table I, where En denotes the nth column of E.
The queries are generated by randomizing E in the same way as in (7).
For each node n, the query Q
[1]
n is the nth column of Q
[1]
[1:N ], where every (N−M−T+1)K
entries form a query vector for each round, denoted by Q
[1],(r)
n , r ∈ [1 : M ].
Answers: Each node receives M query vectors, and for each forms the inner product with
the stored data vector, resulting in M symbols. To ensure database-privacy, all nodes share
M(M+T−1) independent uniformly random symbols from Fq, denoted by [S
(r)
j ]j∈[1:M+T−1],r∈[1:M ],
which are independent of the database and unavailable to the user. The answer sent back to the
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user by node n at round r is generated by
A[1],(r)n = 〈Q
[1],(r)
n , Dn〉+ φnψn
M+T−1∑
j=1
S
(r)
j · λ
j−1
n .
Because we use an MDS code of dimension T in the generation of queries, every T nodes
receive statistically uniformly random query vectors. Hence, user-privacy is guaranteed.
To show that the user can decode W1 successfully and database-privacy is guaranteed, we
illustrate via transmission at round 1 under Case 1. Let E
(1)
n denote the vector of the first
(N−M−T+1)K entries in En, the inner products 〈E
(1)
n , Dn〉 for all N nodes retrieve N−M−T+1
linear combinations of different symbols from W1.
A[1],(1)n = 〈Q
[1],(1)
n , Dn〉+ φnψn
M+T−1∑
j=1
S
(1)
j · λ
j−1
n
= 〈U˜ (1)n + E
(1)
n , Dn〉+ φnψn
M+T−1∑
j=1
S
(1)
j · λ
j−1
n
= φnψn
(N−M−T+1)K∑
l=1
(U
(1)
l,1 · 1 + · · ·+U
(1)
l,T · λ
T−1
n )
· (Wl,1 · 1 + · · ·+Wl,M · λ
M−1
n ) + 〈E
(1)
n , Dn〉
+ φnψn
M+T−1∑
j=1
S
(1)
j · λ
j−1
n
= φnψn
M+T−1∑
j=1
(X
(1)
j + S
(1)
j ) · λ
j−1
n + 〈E
(1)
n , Dn〉,
where denoting the columns of W by W1, . . . ,WM ,
X
(1)
j =
∑
t+m=j+1
1≤t≤T,1≤m≤M
〈U(1)t ,Wm〉
Hence, at round 1, the user downloads N symbols, which are independent linear combinations
ofM+T−1 unknowns (X(1)j +S
(1)
j )’s and N−M−T+1 unknowns 〈E
(1)
n , Dn〉. Therefore, the user
can solve the linear system and obtain N−M−T+1 linear combinations of different symbols
from W1. The data-base privacy is be guaranteed because of the common randomness S
(1)
j . Over
all M rounds, the user obtain M(N−M−T+1) independent linear combinations of symbols of
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W1, which are sufficient to decode the desired file W1.
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